The Conference was originally proposed by the Soviet Union in 1969, repeating the proposal it had first made in 1954, but which had then met with a cold response from the West. The Soviet interest in the Conference was to consolidate the status quo in Europe, including the division of Germany. It also aimed at de facto ratifying the post-war spheres of influence and the Soviet position in East and Central Europe, which the USSR had confirmed the year before with the occupation of Czechoslovakia.

Finland’s bold move

Finland, however, saw the proposal as an opportunity both to enhance détente in Europe and to strengthen Finland’s status as a neutral country. Thus, Finland decided to make its own proposal, which differed from the Soviet initiative in that the recognition of two Germanys would not be a precondition for holding a meeting, while also including the United States and Canada. Finland offered to host the Conference, being in a unique position to make such an offer, having recognised neither of the two Germanies while maintaining unproblematic working relations with both.

Six years of hard labour

The processing of the initiative took six years. It became a genuine negotiating process rather than the propaganda forum many had initially expected. Security issues were dealt with in the so-called Basket One, with the aim of easing military tensions through confidence-building measures and the recognition of the inviolability of post-World War II borders. The second basket sought to promote trade, industrial cooperation, and joint environmental and scientific projects across borders.

The third basket, on humanitarian rights, sought to encourage the free flow of information, promote cultural exchanges, and protect basic human rights such as freedom of thought, conscience, and religion.

The Soviets were content with the security basket and the consolidation of the status quo, which in the West was also understood as a surrogate for the peace treaty that was never drafted or signed after World War II. The second basket drew little attention, being seen as an encouragement to continue developing business as usual.

The third basket as a time bomb

It was the third basket that ultimately had the greatest, and largely unforeseen, consequences. The commitments made in the third basket, while commendable in Western eyes, were regarded as largely ritualistic in both East and West. I freely admit to having shared the cynical underestimation of their significance at the time.

But in the hands of dissidents and opposition groups yearning for an opening of their moribund communist systems, the Final Act proved to be a powerful weapon. They demanded that their leaders live up to the commitments they had signed. It was awkward for the authorities to try to stop the spread of texts that had been signed by Brezhnev, Ceaușescu, Husák, and others. This gave groups such as the Moscow Helsinki Group (1976) and later Helsinki Watch (1978) greater opportunities to demand space for a free civil society.

From CSCE to OSCE

The institutional framework for cooperation was also strengthened when the CSCE was transformed into the Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) in 1990 in Paris. This took place at a time when the Berlin Wall had already come down and the old regimes in East and Central Europe were about to fall.

The OSCE has since expanded to 57 participating States, and it has played a useful, if never a leading, role in managing some of the crises in Europe linked to the dissolution of centralised entities such as the USSR and the FRY. Its Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR) has done particularly valuable work in addressing the human dimension of security.

But the OSCE is not a supranational body, and it can function only insofar as all its participating States allow. Since the beginning of Russia’s ongoing aggression against Ukraine, Russia and Belarus have been able to cripple the organisation’s ability to function, leaving it in limbo. Even so, the OSCE must be kept alive so that it is ready for use if and when Europe can return to more normal conditions.

In today’s world, where major powers are both in deeds and in words challenging the rules-based international order, we should not forget that the OSCE is a valuable and praiseworthy part of that order, and one that we need to defend.