What a familiar sight this Weltsaal is. The name itself stakes a claim and sets a level of ambition regarding the ever challenging – at times too challenging – task of serving in this Ministry: keeping an eye on the entire world. That is your job.

I want to thank you very much, Mr Wadephul, for inviting me today. It is a reflection of our friendly cooperation. It also gives me the opportunity to congratulate this venerable Ministry on its anniversary and to express my gratitude and respect to its staff. So please accept my sincere thanks, as well as my heartfelt congratulations, on this 75th anniversary!

The history of the Federal Foreign Office is their story, the story of those who represent our country throughout the world and who over the course of 75 years – through their work as much as through their character, their humanity and their integrity – have nurtured trust in our country. This new trust, after the total political and moral ruin caused by Nazi Germany, was and remains the foundation of the Federal Republic’s success story.

During my time here as Minister, or at the Federal Chancellery, in the German Bundestag or for nearly ten years now as Federal President, I have personally had the opportunity to get to know and value entire generations of diplomats and staff at all levels of the service. More than a few of you are among my closest colleagues and friends.

Members of the Federal Foreign Office, I know that, for all of you, the foreign service is more than just a job. Joining this service is a major life decision, a way of life that for you and your families has often been great and exciting, often not easy – but in any case, one that is and remains enormously important for our country.

The history of the Federal Foreign Office has been shaped by you, by people – and it will continue to be shaped by people. Artificial intelligence may be useful – for example, when it comes to preparing so many speaking notes – and some would say too many. Of course, the Office of the Federal President contributes to this – I admit that I am also at fault here.

But especially now, at this breathtaking and highly perilous time, surrounded by constant political and technological disruption, we need you: smart diplomats, with your power of judgment, your ability to communicate and your integrity. While today many may view diplomacy as weak and unimportant, it is in times like these marked by crises and conflicts that we need more, not less, diplomacy.

How nice it is to see that the next generation of diplomats has been given a leading role at this anniversary celebration. My dear trainee diplomats, I have the greatest respect for your decision to enter this profession. I am pleased that, particularly in our present-day world, at a time that heaven knows is not easy, you have said yes to serving our country, and yes to the foreign service.

For me – if you will allow a short historical digression – the decision to lead a very political life occurred a little over thirty-five years ago. Up to 1989, I could easily have imagined remaining in academia. In the autumn of 1989, I was working on the final chapter of my dissertation when the Berlin Wall fell. The future seemed filled with possibilities, and people were full of confidence. Germany’s historical good fortune following the war – a new beginning, the economic miracle, reconciliation, European integration and, finally, reunification – all this seemed back then, in the early 1990s, to form a long and unbroken upward trend, one that would impact the world and the future: more peace, more freedom and more democracy. We – I myself and possibly some of the older colleagues here in this room – wanted to be part of this development. Free from naivety and with plenty of energy, we wanted to help build this world, making it a little better day by day, and in the process impart to it some of the good fortune that Germany had experienced.

The contrast to the present day could hardly be greater. Confidence has become quite rare, especially here in the heart of Europe. The world around us seems to be growing a little more dangerous and brutal – or at least more irrational – every day. And just as the international order that we work to uphold is disintegrating day by day, we – Germany – seem to be getting ever more sidelined on the global stage. To put it bluntly: the more we are shocked at where global politics is headed, the less we are able to do about it. In future, will we still need a foreign service? will be the lead-in question for the discussion during the second part of today’s event. It is a daring and honest question to ask at an anniversary celebration – and one that, simply by needing to be asked, raises concern.

Ivan Krastev recently remarked that Germany’s present-day troubles are, paradoxically, not caused by the failure, but rather by the success of its post-war policies. Precisely because the lessons we have drawn from the Second World War seemed to have been forever ingrained, and specifically because war in Europe appeared to have become unthinkable, is the reason why we Germans have had a hard time dealing with the return of brute power politics, when international law is violated and when the historical memory of many does not even reach back as far as Iraq, Libya or Afghanistan.

In short, German foreign policy faces a fundamental realignment. We need to redraw our mental map of the world.

In these historically challenging times, you – esteemed staff assembled here in this room and your many colleagues at our missions abroad – are serving our country. While the circumstances are of course completely different compared to 1951 or the Cold War era, the strategic challenge may be no less great today than for those who, 75 years ago, set out to chart a course toward a new, peaceful foreign policy that would build trust in the Federal Republic.

Why am I talking about such a fundamental shift? Four cornerstones defined the decades of what was at first West German foreign policy following the re-establishment of the Federal Foreign Office: first, the division of Germany and overcoming that division. Second, integration with the West. Third, European integration. And, fourth, the relationship and dialogue with the Eastern part of our continent.

A level-headed assessment of the situation in 2026 reveals that three of these four cornerstones have, at least for the foreseeable future, been swept aside – making the one remaining invariable cornerstone, European unity, all the more important.

Let me briefly sketch out the strategic picture: The German question, which remained unresolved for many years and occupied us for decades in both parts of Germany, has been conclusively answered and written into international law since 1990; moreover, I should mention that our ranks have been bolstered with the addition of great colleagues from the eastern part of Germany. That said, internal unification of our country remains a great task for our society. But it is – luckily – no longer a foreign policy task.

Although the cornerstones of West and East, the relationship with Washington and with Moscow, preoccupied all successive German Governments of the past decades, this period is particularly associated with two names, two Chancellors – Konrad Adenauer, who firmly positioned the young Federal Republic within the Western Alliance, and Willy Brandt, who back then initiated what became known as the new Ostpolitik. Both of these cornerstones are now being overturned in a way that was hitherto unthinkable.

Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine has fundamentally broken with all principles of the European security order. Efforts to build a “common European home” with Russia after the fall of the Iron Curtain have occupied this Ministry and generations of politicians – including myself – for decades. Precisely because it was us Germans, after all, who had seen for ourselves how a policy of small steps, a policy of dialogue combined with strength, of deterrence and détente, could be successful – ranging from the early days of the CSCE more than 50 years ago to the fortunate outcomes of reunification and the EU’s eastward enlargement. That is why we tenaciously kept up these efforts for a long time – and today, we know we did so for too long. With Russia’s tanks at the gates of Kyiv, all of these efforts were reduced to rubble and a horrible war was unleashed on Ukraine. Even after the war, I think, we will not be able to focus on peace with this Russia, but rather on what we perceive the likelihood of conflict to be. In other words, Europe must now organise its security against Russia, not with Russia.

The rift in the transatlantic relationship since the start of President Trump’s second term is no less deep. I therefore refer to our day and age as being marked by a double epochal shift – not because what is happening in Moscow and in Washington is the same, or even comparable. But because both shifts are forcing a sea change in our foreign policy.

Just as I believe our relationship with Russia can never return to what it was before 24 February 2022, I think we cannot turn back the clock on the transatlantic relationship to where it was prior to 20 January 2025. The rift is too deep, and the trust that has been lost in American great-power politics is too great – not only among Allies, but around the world. Even a future US Government will not simply be able to restart relations where they once stood in the days of the “friendly hegemon” and its guarantees for a liberal international order – an order that also brought us democracy.

With regard to Russia, Germany has had the painful experience of learning how overdependence can make us vulnerable. We were compelled, virtually overnight, to dissolve long-standing energy ties with Russia, and we incurred significant costs in the process. These relationships, predicated at the time on mutual rationality and valid contracts, had been established and deepened over decades, dating back to the first pipes-for-gas agreement of 1970.

In the transatlantic relationship, too, we must wean ourselves off dependencies that make us vulnerable. This applies first and foremost to security and technology. Achieving European sovereignty in defence and technology is not something we can take care of this afternoon. Rather, it is a project that will take generations to complete. However, the magnitude of the task must no longer be used to delay taking action, neither by us nor by our European partners.

Germany’s Federal Armed Forces must become the backbone of conventional defence in Europe. Federal Governments have taken the necessary decisions for this since 24 February 2022. Yet to accomplish this our Federal Armed Forces need not only political support, but also the full support of our entire society. This means having adequate funding, modern equipment and more personnel. If voluntary service is not sufficient, then we must return to a model based on compulsory service. I believe that mandatory public service for all would be best: some in the Federal Armed Forces, others in social institutions.

In the sphere of technology, dependency on the United States is even greater, and we must be all the less willing to accept it. We know, after all, that leadership in technology translates not only into foreign-policy power, but also into power to use digital platforms and social media to exert influence on our domestic policy. Last year in Munich, we were told, right to our face, how the US Administration is set on doing just that, on weakening the liberal and united Europe. Maybe the current dispute between Anthropic and the Pentagon can be a wake-up call, or even an opportunity, for Europe. Europe has lots going for it as a location for technology. It has talent, it has markets and it has opportunities – but it also has ethical standards. Those are the four pillars on which we should build.

Going back now to the cornerstones of our foreign policy, I mentioned Adenauer and the integration with the West. What does integration with the West mean today? That is one of our era’s difficult questions, a question to which this Ministry must find answers.

For 75 years, we have had a close partnership, marked by occasional differences, with the United States. These included significant differences over the Iraq War. However, we were always able to say that we have a common foundation where we can settle our differences and to which we can return. This no longer holds true today. The West remains – and on this I insist – a valuable normative ideal. But the West does not currently exist as a political reality.

That is why foreign policy realism now means that we must not delude ourselves! That is what Mark Carney meant in Davos, when he referred to Václav Havel’s sign in a shop window.

Realism means that we must be pragmatic in our dealings with this US Administration and we must focus on our core interests. But this realism also means that we should not bend to others’ views! The current US Administration has a different worldview to ours – one that does not care about established rules, about partnership and long-standing trust. We cannot change that. It is the situation we need to deal with. But we have no reason to take on this worldview for ourselves.

Great powers may survive in a world without rules. Indeed, in the short term, they may even benefit. That does not apply to us. Nor does it apply to the overwhelming majority of countries. That, after all, should be the bridge we need today! This connects us with so many other people, particularly with the emerging middle powers all around the world.

Since the start of my term in office as Federal President, I have sought contact with these middle powers. Countries that are not in the headlines every day, but that have much to offer us strategically – and I am absolutely certain the same applies vice versa.

Thanks to fantastic support from and cooperation with you in the Federal Foreign Office and at the German Embassies, I have been able to travel many, many times to the ASEAN region, the Gulf states, Turkey, Kenya, South Africa, Chile and Brazil. Just last week, I was in Mexico again and in some of its neighbouring countries to strengthen our partnership with a region of the world that is by no means merely the backyard of a great power.

All of these middle powers are seeking contact with us, as they too want to reduce dependencies and place their partnerships on a broad footing, as do we. These countries certainly do not share all of our views and interests, but they do share a very central aim with us, namely that the world of the future should be more than a duel between the US and China. But that is precisely why these countries also look very closely at what part we are playing in stabilising international rules and an order that serves everyone, not just a few.

For that reason, I am convinced that our foreign policy must be pragmatic and persuasive – and where this is not the case, that is what it must become.

However, this does not mean abandoning international law. Our foreign policy does not become more persuasive when we do not designate a violation of international law as such. We have already had to deal with this in the Gaza War and we have to deal with it in the Iran War, too. Because I believe this war is a violation of international law – there is little doubt about that. The fact that the justification of an impending attack on the United States does not hold water also appears to have been the opinion of parts of the US intelligence community. Moreover, this war is a politically fatal error, and what I find most frustrating is that it was a truly avoidable and unnecessary war if its goal was to stop Iran on the path to a nuclear bomb. The nuclear deal had already helped us to make so much progress. We were never further away from Iran having nuclear weapons than after the signing of the JCPoA on 14 July 2015. Many people from this Ministry worked very hard and for many years to help achieve this Agreement. It was the US Secretary of State who said at the signing ceremony that we should not underestimate the historic importance of the moment; ‘for with this agreement,’ he claimed, ‘we are preventing a war that we Americans would have had to wage against Iran.’

In the second year of his first term in office, President Trump withdrew the US from the JCPoA; in his second term in office, he is now waging this war.

Members of the Federal Foreign Office, international law is not like an old glove that we should remove when others do so. On the contrary, it is vital for all those who cannot count themselves among the great powers.

Even though it may be ignored or violated by some, international law has lost none of its importance as a regulatory framework, a rule book and a source of legitimacy, neither for Germany nor, for that matter, for Europe. This Europe would be lost in a world without law and rules, as the European Union itself is built on law and rules. It would collapse like a house of cards if we took on the worldview of brute power.

This brings us full circle as regards the four historic cornerstones which I mentioned earlier. Three of them have been swept away, and so this cornerstone – European unity – is all the more urgent. A united and strong Europe that is no longer merely a commitment from our past, but rather a geopolitical imperative for our present.

The President of the European Commission recently spelt out to the members of the European External Action Service that Europe should be a great power. Big words! I am not concerned about whether this is realistic. Instead, I am far more interested in the question of what sort of power Europe desires to be.

Europe cannot be powerful if we adapt to the zeitgeist of ruthlessness. We can only be powerful if we stand up against this zeitgeist! We need to become stronger militarily – far, far stronger. But this alone will not be enough. We need to reinforce what has made us strong. The united Europe enjoys prosperity, peace, freedom and cultural appeal because we show consideration. Because showing consideration is part of Europe’s DNA: showing consideration for one another, for conflicting interests and their settlement, for law and rules, for history and national backgrounds. Let us keep this European reflex – and who better to do so than you here in the Ministry?

I have just turned 70 and can tell you that old age may not have many advantages, but it indeed does have a few. One benefit is that one becomes somewhat more relaxed in the face of short-lived political and media trends. In the period since 1998 alone, during which I first became involved in foreign policy and which I later had the honour to shape, comments on our foreign policy have seen remarkable swings of the pendulum. I remember times when diplomacy with difficult countries was seen as unseemly; times when anything of a military nature was regarded as suspicious or mistaken; times when every screw in the wheel of an armoured transport vehicle had to be specifically justified in the Report on Military Equipment Exports and still came in for merciless criticism. When I supported NATO’s two-percent target in Wales in 2014, public support at home for this goal was muted. Germany wanted to be a force for peace without military strength; its aim was to shape the world with intelligent diplomacy.

The pendulum has now swung in the other direction. People say that it is naive to refer to international law, that diplomacy doesn’t change anything, that we don’t need cultural relations policy, that military strength is the only thing that counts. I sometimes can’t believe my eyes when I read media commentaries writing classical diplomacy off as the weak limb of a courageous foreign and security policy based on military strength.

It is time that we developed a grown-up stance on the relationship between military strength and foreign-policy wisdom, a stance that is taken for granted in other countries, namely that military strength cannot exist without the other, i.e. foreign-policy wisdom.

Members of the foreign service, I truly want to encourage you not to lose your compass! You know that German foreign policy will always need four pillars: military strength so that we are taken seriously; wise diplomacy in order to find solutions and forge alliances; soft power – that is, culture, business and science – to attract the outside world; and an international order to provide a framework and direction.

I urge you not to lose this compass when the political map of the world is being redrawn today. As a foreign service, you should be confident, but not arrogant! You have so many reasons to be confident, so many role models in the 75 years of Federal Foreign Office history; the first staff members, who took this Ministry, with its difficult policy and staff history, on a new democratic path: the first women, such as Ellinor von Puttkamer, who succeeded in breaking into a thoroughly male-dominated system; the witnesses to global history, such as those who looked after thousands of East Germans for weeks on the grounds of the West German Embassy in Prague in 1989, under the balcony where Genscher gave his speech; or your colleagues from East and West who laid down the good fortune of German unity in the Two plus Four Agreement a year later after long nights of negotiations; the crisis managers in posts all over the world affected by war or conflict, from the convoys in Bosnia in the 1990s to the traumatic moments at the airport in Kabul and unfortunately now once again in Ukraine and the Middle East; and of course the many hard workers, such as those who brought a quarter of a million Germans home from around the world at the start of the COVID-19 pandemic in 2020, but were hardly able to go home themselves for many weeks.

I am grateful to you and all those who bring so much dedication and commitment to the foreign service.

Members of the Federal Foreign Office, none of us, myself included, know what the world of the future will look like. All I know is that there is no going back to the 1990s, or to the 19th century. Germany will not be at the centre of historic global events, but we will also not be inevitably pushed to the sidelines. There are simply no historical blueprints for the geopolitical moment where we now find ourselves. What an exciting time to be part of the foreign service! A service that has reinvented itself so often can and will do so again. Do it well! And trust in your compass!

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